Admiralty Practicum
Volume 1989
Issue 2 Winter 1989

Article 3

Miles v. Melrose United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 11
September 1989 882 F.2d 976
Jules F. Vallay '90

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

Brittain

v.

U.S. Lines (Cont.)

proceeding, since the seamen would not have been obliged to
enforce their liens in the Singapore action had there not been a
bankruptcy proceeding. Furthermore, the seamen had no
grounds to object to the post-petition financing promised by the
banks, since the banks' liens, even prior to the order which
approved post-petition financing, far exceeded the amount of
money derived from the sale of the ships. The court emphatically
acknowledged that the seamen should be "distressed that Sin
gapore law accords the banks' lien a priority higher than their
own, whereas the reverse situation would have applied ... lin a!
Bankruptcy Court," but noted that this court was in no position to
remedy this inequity since the law of the forum administering
the res governs the priority of the liens. See GulfOil Trading Co.
v. Creole Supply, 596 F.2d 515, 521 <2d Cir. 1979>.
Peter M. Corri gan '90

ANALYSIS: The Second Circuit rejected the seamen's first

contention that the banks somehow precipitated the arrest of the
vessels in a jurisdiction where their liens would have priority
over the seamen's liens observing that there was no factual
proof to support this allegation. The court then declared that the
seamen could not challenge the validity of the July 27 order on
the grounds that they did not receive notice of the request for its
entry. The court observed that even if the seamen were entitled
to notice, their lack of notice did not result in any adverse
consequences and therefore they could not object to the order on
this grounds. See In re Photo Promotion Associate, Inc., 53
Bankr. 759 <S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Additionally, the seamen could not object to the order which
permitted the parties to pursue their claims in the Singapore
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A u ni on has a duty under the general maritime law to warn a shipowner or operator with whom it has a collective
bargai ning agreement of the k nown propensities of a member sent to work on the vessel.

FACTS: On July 5, 1984, Clifford Melrose was sent by his

Under the facts of the case at bar, the coroner's report stated
that the victim had suffered 62 stabbings or cuts. There was no
evidence to contradict the coroner's analysis of the savagery of
the attack thereby confirming Melrose's extremely violent dis
position. Melrose failed to measure up to the standard of this
calling and the Fifth Circuit held that the vessel was thereby
rendered unseaworthy as a matter of law.
As to the issue of indemnification, the court.stated that in order
to decide whether the claim for indemnification from the union
for the tort claim of failure of duty to warn, is cognizable, the
court must assume that the alleged negligence can be proved that the union knew a worker had a violent propensity, that the
union could foresee that he might injure the other crew members
and that the union's failure to warn the shipowner was in fact
the legal cause of the injury.
In order to determine whether the union owes a duty to warn
the shipowner of the violent propensities of a referred member,
the court noted §314 of the Restatement of Torts <Second> that
provides that where a force is within the actor's control, his
failure to control it is treated as though he were actively directing
it. Thus, by referring Melrose when it knew that he was dangerous,
the union was no longer a mere bystander, but rather was in
control of the process that presented the evil. The shipowner is
dependent on the union contractually for its workers and the
union is in a unique position to prevent the harm.
The court noted that where two parties stand in a relationship
of dependence, the law may impose a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect the dependent party from injury. To allow the
union to refer a seaman known to have violent propensities and
fail to warn the shipowner would contravene maritime law
principles. The seaman's safety can best be promoted by" 'plac
lingJ liability on the party who was truly at fault and who
should mend his negligent ways to prevent further injury.' "
Flunker v. United States, 528 F.2d 239, 243 <9th Cir. 1975). The
court stressed that the owner/operator still warrants the vessel's
seawor�hines�. The union is not charged with any warranties as
to the disposi twns of the crew or an independent duty to investi
gate If a member IS vwlent, but rather is only required to
exercise ordinary care when it knows that a worker is likely to
harm other crew members. The court reversed the district
court's dismissal of the third party complaint and reinstated the
shipowner's claim for indemnification or contribution.
Jules F. V allay '90

union to join the crew of the M/V Archon, replacing another cook
in a three man galley. The seamen servmg on Archon were
hired pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. On July
18, 1984, Melrose provoked an argument with James Jackson,
the chief steward/baker. Jackson believed Melrose to be under
the influence of alcohol, hostile and angry. Shortly after this
confrontation, Jackson went to Ludwick Torregano's cabin. Tor
regano was the assistant steward and the third man in the
galley. Jackson found Torregano dead.
The coroner's report indicated that Torregano had been stabbed
or cut at least 62 times. Jackson testified at Melrose's murder
trial that after discovering the body, he saw Melrose standing
naked and wet with a blood stained towel wrapped around his
arm. Melrose's blood alcohol level was .19lk. Melrose was convicted
of second degree murder.
Mercedel Miles, Torregano's mother and administratrix of his
estate, asserted that she is entitled to damages as a result of the
vessel's unseaworthiness under general maritime law and for
negligence under the Jones Act 46 U.S.C.A. §688. The shipowners
sought indemnity from the union for the union's failure to warn
the shipowners of Melrose's violent propensities.
The district court dismisse� the defendant's third party comp
lamt agamst the umon for failure to state a claim.
ISSUES: ( 1) Was the MIV Archon rendered unseaworthy as a
matter of law due to the unfittness of Melrose?
( 2) Does a union have a duty under general maritime
law to warn a shipowner or operator with whom it has a collective
bargaining agreement of the known violent propensities of a
member sent to work on the vessel?

ANALYSIS: In order to find a vessel unseaworthy, a plaintitl
must prove that a crew member was "not equal in disposition
and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling." Clevenger
v. Star Fish and Oyster Co., Inc., 325 F.2d 397, 402 <5th Cir.
1963>. General maritime law requires an absolute duty of the
shipowner to provide the members of the crew with a seaworthy
vessel. Not only will a damaged hull render a ship unseaworthy,
but so will a seaman not reasonably fit. While this standard
requires a fact-specific inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has previously
held that where an assault is extremely violent, this in and of
itself can be sufficient evidence that the assailant is not equal in
disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling.
Clevenger, supra.
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